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The effects of an additional strategy or character called loner in the snowdrift game are studied
in a well-mixed population or fully-connected network and in a square lattice. The snowdrift game,
which is a possible alternative to the prisoner’s dilemma game in studying cooperative phenomena
in competing populations, consists of two types of strategies, C (cooperators) and D (defectors). In
a fully-connected network, it is found that either C lives with D or the loners take over the whole
population. In a square lattice, three possible situations are found: a uniform C-population, C lives
with D, and the coexistence of all three characters. The presence of loners is found to enhance
cooperation in a square lattice by enhancing the payoff of cooperators. The results are discussed in
terms of the effects in restricting a player to compete only with his nearest neighbors in a square
lattice, as opposed to competing with all players in a fully-connected network.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Cc
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG)
[1, 2, 3] and the snowdrift game (SG) [4] have be-
come standard paradigms for studying the possible emer-
gence of cooperative phenomena in a competitive setting.
Physicists find such emergent phenomena fascinating, as
similar cooperative effects are also found in interacting
systems in physics that can be described by some min-
imal models, e.g. models of interacting spin systems.
These games are also essential in the understanding of
coexistence of (and competition between) egoistic and
altruistic behavior that appear in many complex sys-
tems in biology, sociology and economics. The basic
PDG [5, 6] consists of two players deciding simultane-
ously whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If one
plays C and the other plays D, the cooperator pays a cost
of S = −c while the defector receives the highest payoff
T = b (b > c > 0). If both play C, each player receives
a payoff of R = b − c > 0. If both play D, the payoff is
P = 0. Thus, the PDG is characterized by the ordering of
the four payoffs T > R > P > S, with 2R > T + S. In a
single round of the game, it is obvious that defection is a
better action in a fully connected (well-fixed) population,
regardless of the opponents’ decisions. Modifications on
the basic PDG are, therefore, proposed in order to induce
cooperations and to explain the wide-spread cooperative
behavior observed in the real world. These modifications
include, for example, the iterated PDG [1, 2], spatially
extended PDG [7, 8, 9, 10] and games with a third strat-
egy [11, 12, 13, 14].
The snowdrift game (SG), which is equivalent to the
∗Electronic address: dfzheng@zjuem.zju.edu.cn
hawk-dove or chicken game [4, 15], is a model somewhat
favorable for cooperation. It is best introduced using
the following scenario [16]. Consider two drivers hur-
rying home in opposite directions on a road blocked by
a snowdrift. Each driver has two possible actions – to
shovel the snowdrift (cooperate (C)) or not to do any-
thing (not-to-cooperate or “defect” (D)). If they cooper-
ate, they could be back home earlier and each will get
a reward of b′. Shovelling is a laborious job with a to-
tal cost of c′. Thus, each driver gets a net reward of
R = b′ − c′/2. If both drivers take action D, they both
get stuck, and each gets a reward of P = 0. If only
one driver takes action C and shovels the snowdrift, then
both drivers can also go home. The driver taking action
D (not to shovel) gets home without doing anything and
hence gets a payoff T = b′, while the driver taking action
C gets a “sucker” payoff of S = b′ − c′. The SG refers
to the case when b′ > c′ > 0, leading to the ranking of
the payoffs T > R > S > P . This ordering of the pay-
offs defines the SG. Therefore, both the PDG and SG are
defined by a payoff matrix of the form
C D
C
D
(
R S
T P
)
,
(1)
and they differ only in the ordering of P and S. It is this
difference that makes cooperators persist more easily in
the SG than in the PDG. In a well-mixed population, co-
operators and detectors coexist. Due to the difficulty in
measuring payoffs and the ordering of the payoffs accu-
rately in real world situations where game theory is ap-
plicable [17, 18], the SD has been taken to be a possible
alternative to the PDG in studying emerging cooperative
phenomena [16].
The present work will focus on two aspects of cur-
rent interest. In many circumstances, the connections
2in a competing population are better modelled by some
networks providing limited interactions than a fully-
connected network. Previous studies showed that differ-
ent spatial structures might lead to different behaviors
[7, 8, 19, 20, 21]. For example, it has been demonstrated
that spatial structures would promote cooperation in the
PDG [7, 8], but would suppress cooperation in the SG
[16]. There are other variations on the SG that resulted
in improved cooperation [22, 23]. Here, we explore the
effects of an underlying network on the evolutionary SG
in a population in which there exists an additional type
of players. The latter is related to the fact that real-
world systems usually consist of people who would adopt
a strategy other than just C and D. For example, there
may be people who do not like to participate in the com-
petition and would rather take a small but fixed payoff.
Hauert et al. studied the effects of the presence of such
persons, called loners [11, 12], in a generalization of the
PDG called the public goods game(PGG). Motivated by
these works of Hauert et al. [11, 12, 16], we study the
effects of risk averse loners in the evolutionary SG. In
our model, evolution or adaptation is built in by allow-
ing players to replace his character or strategy by that
of a better-performing connected neighbor. We focus on
both the steady state and the dynamics, and study how
an underlying network structure affects the emergence of
cooperation. It is found that in a fully-connected net-
work, the C-players and D-players cannot coexist with
the loners. In a square lattice, however, cooperators are
easier to survive. Depending on the payoffs, there are
situations in which C-players, D-players and loners can
coexist.
In Sec. II, the evolutionary SG with loners in a pop-
ulation with connections is presented. In Sec. III, we
present detailed numerical results in fully-connected net-
works and in square lattices, and discuss the physics of
the observed features. The effects of noise are also dis-
cussed. We summarize our results in Sec. IV.
II. THE MODEL
We consider an evolutionary snowdrift game in which
the competitions between players are characterized by
the payoff matrix
C D L
C
D
L

 R S QT P Q
Q Q Q

 . (2)
Here, each player takes on one of three possible characters
or strategies: to cooperate (C), to defect (D), or to act
as a loner (L). The matrix element gives the payoff to
a player using a strategy listed in the left hand column
when the opponent uses a strategy in the top row. In the
basic SG, it is useful to assign R = 1 so that the payoffs
can be characterized by a single parameter r = c′/2 =
c′/(2b′− c′) representing the cost-to-reward ratio [16]. In
terms of 0 < r < 1, we have T = 1+ r, R = 1, S = 1− r,
and P = 0. A competition involving a loner leads to a
payoff Q for both players. Here, we explore the range of
0 < Q < 1.
Spatial networking effects and evolutions are incorpo-
rated into the SG as follows. At the beginning of the
game, the players are arranged onto the nodes of a net-
work and the character s(i) of each player is assigned ran-
domly among the choices of C, D, and L. Our discussion
will be mainly on fully-connected graphs and regular lat-
tices. In a fully-connected network, every player is con-
nected to all other players. In a square lattice, a player
is linked only to his four nearest neighbors. Numerical
studies are carried out using Monte Carlo simulations as
reported in the work of Szabo´ et al. [13] (see also Refs.
[12, 14]). The evolution of the character of the players is
governed by the following dynamics. At any time during
the game, each player competes with all the players that
he is linked to and hence has a payoff. A randomly cho-
sen player i reassesses his own strategy by comparing his
payoff P (i) with the payoff P (j) of a randomly chosen
connected neighbor j. With probability
W [s(i), s(j)] =
1
1 + exp ([P (i)− P (j)]/K) , (3)
the player i adopts the strategy of player j. Otherwise,
the strategy of player i remains unchanged. Here K is
a noise parameter [12, 13, 14] that determines the like-
lihood that player i replaces his strategy when he meets
someone with a higher payoff. For K ≈ 0, a player i is al-
most certain to replace (not to replace) his strategy when
he meets someone with a better (worse) payoff. For large
K, a player has a probability of 1/2 to replace his strat-
egy, regardless of whether P (j) is better or worse than
P (i). In a fully connected network, a player’s character
may be replaced by any player in the system. In a square
lattice, a player’s character can only be replaced by one
of his four connected neighbors. As the game evolves, the
fractions of players with the three characters also evolve.
These fractions are referred to as frequencies. Depend-
ing on the parameters r and Q, the cooperator frequency
fC , defector frequency fD, and loner frequency fL take
on different values in the long time limit.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Fully-connected network
We performed detailed numerical studies on our model.
The number of players in the system is taken to be
N = 104. In getting the fraction of players of different
characters in the long time limit, we typically average
over the results of 103 Monte-Carlo time steps per site
(MCS), after allowing 5 × 103 MCS for the system to
reach the long time limit. Averages are also taken over
10 initial configurations of the same set of parameters.
Figure 1 shows the results for fully connected networks.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) Cooperator frequency fC , (b) de-
fector frequency fD, (c) loner frequency fL as a function of r
for three different values of the loner payoff Q = 0.3, 0.5, and
0.7 in a fully-connected network. The results of the snowdrift
game without loners are also included for comparison (solid
lines). (d) Phase diagram showing the two phases separated
by rL(Q) in the r-Q parameter space. The symbols show the
numerical results of rL(Q) and the line gives the functional
form
√
1−Q.
A value of K = 0.1 is taken. The cooperator frequency
fC , defector frequency fD, and loner frequency fL are
obtained as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r for
three different values of the loner’s payoff Q = 0.3, 0.5,
and 0.7. In the absence of loners [16], fC(r) = 1− r and
fD = r in a fully connected network. From Figure 1, the
loners extinct for a range of values of r < rL(Q) in which
the behavior is identical to the basic SG. For r > rL(Q),
the loners invade the whole population and both coop-
erators and defectors disappear. This is similar to the
results in the PDG [13] and in the PGG [11]. In a fully
connected network, the three characters cannot coexist.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Typical short-time behavior of the co-
operator, defector, and loner frequencies in a fully-connected
network for (a) the phase that C-players and D-players coex-
ist (Q = 0.5 and r = 0.7); and (b) the phase that loners take
out the whole system (Q = 0.5 and r = 0.8).
This is in sharp contrast to the rock-scissors-paper game
[24, 25, 26] on a fully connected network in which the
three strategies coexist. We obtained rL(Q) numerically.
The result is shown in Figure 1(d) as a curve in the r-
Q parameter space. It is found that rL(Q) follows the
functional form
√
1−Q, which will be explained later.
The curve rL(Q) represents a phase boundary that sep-
arates the r-Q space into two regions. The region below
(above) the curve corresponds to a phase in which coop-
erators and defectors (only loners) coexist (exist).
We also studied the temporal evolution in both phases,
i.e., for r < rL(Q) and r > rL(Q). Taking Q = 0.5, for
example, rL = 1/
√
2 = 0.707. Figure 2 shows fC(t),
fD(t) and fL(t) in the first 10
3 MCS. The initial fre-
quencies are 1/3 for all three characters. For values of
r deep into either phase (see Fig. 2), the transient be-
havior dies off rapidly and the extinct character typically
vanishes after ∼ 102 MCS. In the phase where C and D
coexist, fC and fD oscillate slightly with time in the long
time limit, due to the dynamical nature of the game. It
is noted that for r ≈ rL, the strategies compete for a
long while and the transient behavior lasts for a long
time. This slowing down behavior is typical of that near
a transition.
The behavior of rL(Q) =
√
1−Q follows from the rule
of character evolution. In a fully-connected network, all
4C-players have the same payoff P (C) and all D-players
have the same payoff P (D). These payoffs depend on fC ,
fD, and fL at each time step. The payoff for a loner is
NQ at all time, for a system with N ≫ 1. For small K,
fL decays exponentially with time if P (C) and P (D) are
both greater than NQ. In addition, the phase with only
non-vanishing fC and fD is achieved by having P (C) =
P (D). For this phase in the long time limit, P (C) =
N(fC + fD(1 − r)) and P (D) = NfC(1 + r). Together
with fC + fD = 1 (since fL = 0 in the phase under
consideration), the condition P (C) = P (D) implies fC =
1− r and fD = r. These results are identical to the basic
SG (without loners) in a fully connected network. The
validity of this solution requires P (C) > NQ (and hence
P (D) > NQ), which is equivalent to r <
√
1−Q. This
is exactly the phase boundary shown in Figure 1(d).
B. Square Lattice
The behavior of the game in a square lattice is ex-
pected to be quite different, due to the restriction that
a player can only compete with his connected neighbors.
We carried out simulations on 100 × 100 square lattices
with periodic boundary conditions. Figure 3(a)-(c) shows
fC(r), fD(r) and fL(r) for three different values of the
loner payoff Q. The results for the spatial SG (with-
out loners) on a square lattice [16] is also shown (solid
lines in Figure 3(a) and 3(b)) for comparison. A value
K = 0.1 is used. Several features should be noted. For
r < r
(SL)
L
(Q), the loners eventually vanish with fC and
fD take on the mean values in the spatial SG without lon-
ers. This behavior is similar to that in fully connected
networks. For r > r
(SL)
L
(Q), however, the behavior is
different from that in fully connected networks. Here, C,
D, and L characters coexist. Above r
(SL)
L
, fD drops with
r to a finite value, leaving rooms for fL to increase with
r. The cooperator frequency remains finite above r
(SL)
L
.
Therefore, the cooperator frequency or the cooperative
level in the system as a whole is significantly improved
by the presence of loners. For r > r
(SL)
L
, increasing the
payoff Q of loners leads to a higher cooperator frequency
and lower defector frequency. Reading out r
(SL)
L
for dif-
ferent values of Q, we get the phase boundary as shown
in Figure 3(d) that separates a region characterized by
the coexistence of three characters and a region in which
only C and D coexist. The results indicate that, due to
the restriction imposed by the spatial geometry that a
player can only interact with his four nearest neighbors,
it takes a certain non-vanishing value of r for loners to
survive even in the limit of Q→ 1. The behavior is there-
fore different from that in a fully connected network for
which the boundary is given by
√
1−Q. Note that there
exists a region of small values of r in which the steady
state consists of a uniform population of C strategy (see
Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(d)). For small Q, loners are eas-
ier to survive, when compared with the fully connected
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
(a)
 f C
 Q=0.3 
 Q=0.5
 Q=0.7
 no loner 
(b)
 
 
 
f D
(c)
 f L
r
 
(d)
C+D+L
 C+D
ALL C
r
Q
FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) Cooperator frequency fC , (b) de-
fector frequency fD, (c) loner frequency fL as a function of
r for three different values of the loner payoff Q = 0.3, 0.5,
and 0.7 in a square lattice. The results of the snowdrift game
without loners in a square lattice are also included for com-
parison (solid lines). (d) Phase diagram showing the different
phases in the r-Q parameter space. The dashed line shows the
phase boundary obtained by an approximation as discussed
in the text.
case. Putting these results together, the phase diagram
(see Fig. 3(d)) for a square lattice, therefore, shows three
different phases. The most striking effect of the spatial
structure is that cooperators now exist in every phase.
Interestingly, we found that the phase boundary
r
(SL)
L
(Q) in Figure 3(d) can be described quantitatively
as follows. We assume that the survival of loners is re-
lated to the cooperator frequency. In particular, loner
survival requires the cooperator frequency to drop below
a certain level f(Q) and that this value is the same in a
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Typical short-time behavior of the co-
operator, defector, and loner frequencies in a square lattice for
(a) the phase that C-players and D-players coexist (Q = 0.5
and r = 0.55); and (b) the phase that C-players, D-players,
and loners coexist (Q = 0.5 and r = 0.65).
square lattice as in a fully connected network. That is
to say, we assume that loners could survive, for a given
value of Q and K, only when fC < f(Q) = 1−
√
1−Q.
Numerical results also indicate that when all loners ex-
tinct, fC and fD follow the results in a spatial SG with-
out loners. This is shown as the solid line in Figure 3(a).
Therefore, for a given value of Q, we can simply read out
the value of r such that fC = f(Q) from the results in
spatial SG in a square lattice. For different values of Q,
this procedure results in the dashed line shown in Figure
3(d) which describes the phase boundary quite well.
Figure 4 shows the temporal dependence of fC , fD,
and fL in a square lattice for two values of r at Q = 0.5.
For r = 0.55 (Fig. 4(a)), which corresponds to a case in
which only cooperators and defectors coexist, the number
of loners decay rapidly in time, typically within 100 MCS.
After the transient behavior, the cooperator and defec-
tor frequencies only oscillate slightly about their mean
values. This behavior is similar to that in the C and D
coexistence phase in Figure 1(d) for fully-connected net-
works. For r = 0.65 (Fig. 4(b)), which corresponds to
a case with the three characters coexist, the long time
behavior of fC , fD and fL is oscillatory. Similar be-
havior has been found in the rock-scissors-paper game
[24, 25, 26] and in the voluntary PDG [14]. Due to the
0
1
2
3
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
cooperator
defector
all players
(a)
(b)
av
er
ag
e 
pa
yo
ffs
r
FIG. 5: (Color online) (a) Average payoffs of each character
as a function of r in a snowdrift game without loners on a
square lattice. The payoff averaged over all players is also
shown. (b) Average payoffs of cooperators and defectors as a
function of r in a snowdrift game with loners. The parameters
are Q = 0.5 and K = 0.1. Note that the loners, if exist, have
a constant payoff of 4Q. The payoff averaged over all players
is also shown.
dynamical nature of character evolution, there are con-
tinuous replacements of one character by another and
this oscillatory behavior is expected.
The major difference between a square lattice and a
fully-connected network is that in a fully-connected net-
work, each player competes with all other players. As a
result, there are only three payoffs in the system – one
for each type of player, at each time step. The loners,
for example, have a constant payoff of NQ, while the
cooperators and defectors have payoffs that depend on
fC(t) and fD(t). Once NQ is higher than the payoffs
of cooperators and defectors, the number of loners grows
until they take over the whole population. In a square
lattice, however, each player has a payoff that depends
on his character and the detail of his neighborhood, i.e.,
the characters of his four connected neighbors. This im-
plies that the C-players and D-players in a square lattice
may have different payoffs depending on the characters
of his connected neighbors. The loners have a constant
payoff of 4Q. The non-uniform payoffs among C-players
and D-players in a lattice allow some C and D players
to coexist with the loners, by evolving to spatial local
configurations that favor their survivals.
6Since the adaptive rule is related to the payoff of each
character, it will be interesting to compare the payoffs in
a spatial SG without and with loners. Figure 5(a) shows
the mean payoffs of cooperators and defectors as a func-
tion of r in a spatial SG in a square lattice without loners.
The averaged payoff over all players is also shown. For
small r, there is a phase with all C players and the payoff
is 4 for each of the C players. For large r, there is a phase
with all D players and the payoff is zero. For intermediate
r where C and D players coexist, the mean payoff drops
gradually with r. In a spatial SG with loners (Fig. 5(b)),
it is observed that the mean payoffs basically follow that
in Figure 5(a) in the phase where loners are completely
replaced. When loners can survive, the presence of these
loners increases the payoffs of both the remaining cooper-
ators and defectors. The loners themselves have a payoff
of 2 in a 2D square lattice. The cooperators’ payoff is en-
hanced once loners survive and the increase follows the
same form as the increase in the loner frequency with
r (compare the circles in Fig. 5(b) with the squares in
Fig. 3(c) in the range of r when loners survive). When
loners survive, the payoff averaged over all players is sig-
nificantly enhanced due to their presence. This is similar
to what was found in the voluntary PDG [14].
C. Effects of noise
All the results reported so far are for the case of
K = 0.1. This corresponds to a case where the player
is highly likely to replace his character when he meets a
better-performing player. In Figure 6, we show the ef-
fects of the noise parameter for a fixed Q = 0.3. As K
increases, the step-like structure in fC as a function of
r becomes less obvious and fC is gradually suppressed
in the r → 1 limit. The most important effect of a 2D
square lattice is that each player is restricted to inter-
act with his four neighbors. Take a player of character
s(i), he will only encounter a finite number of configura-
tions for which he is competing in. For example, his four
neighbors may consist of 4 C-players; 3 C-players and 1
D-player or 1-loner, etc. Each of these configurations cor-
responds to a P (i). In a square lattice, therefore, there
will be a finite number of payoffs for a C-player, depend-
ing on the characters of the neighbors. Similarly, there
are finite number of payoffs for a D-player. The loners
always get a payoff of 4Q. For K ≈ 0, the adaptive
mechanism is strictly governed by the ordering of these
payoffs. The distribution of players in a square lattice
will then evolve in time according to how the payoffs are
ordered. In the long time limit, only a few favorable lo-
cal configurations will survive and the number of players
in each of these favorable configurations is high. As one
increases r slightly, the ordering of the finite number of
payoffs may not change. Therefore, fC will not change
with r until we reach certain values of r that the order-
ing of the payoffs is changed. This gives rise to the more
sudden changes in fC as observed at some values of r
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FIG. 6: (Color online) (a) The cooperator frequency fC and
(b) the loner frequency fL as a function of r for three different
values of the noise parameter K = 0.1, 0.4 and 1.0.
and it is the reason for having step-like features in fC
and fD for small values of K. As the noise parameter K
increases, the adaptive mechanism is less dependent on
the exact ordering of the payoffs. Therefore, the changes
in fC with r becomes more gradual as K increases. In-
terestingly, less obvious step-like structures in fC are also
observed in the spatial SG without loners in 2D lattices
with a larger coordination number [16]. This is also re-
lated to the picture we just described. A lattice with
more neighbors will give a higher number of neighbor-
hood configurations and hence more values of the payoffs.
More configurations also imply the number of players en-
countering a certain configuration is smaller. Thus, the
number of players involved in a change in the ordering of
the payoffs as r changes is smaller. This has the effect of
making the drop in fC gradual. Therefore, increasing K
for a given fixed coordination number is similar in effect
as increasing the coordination number for fixed K.
IV. SUMMARY
We studied the effects of the presence of loners in a
snowdrift game with loners in fully-connected networks
7and in square lattices. In a fully-connected network, ei-
ther cooperators live with defectors or loners take over
the whole population. The condition for loners to take
over is found to be Q > 1 − r2. This result can be un-
derstood by following the payoffs of each strategy. In a
fully-connected network, the strategies’ payoffs are par-
ticularly simple in that they depend only on the strategy
frequencies at the time under consideration, with each
type of player having the same payoff.
In a square lattice, the spatial SG with loners behave
quite differently. It is found that the cooperators can sur-
vive in the fully parameter space covering 0 < r < 1 and
0 < Q < 1. Depending on the values of these parame-
ters, there are three possible phases: a uniform C-player
population, C-players and D-players coexist, and coex-
istence of the three characters. The underlying lattice
thus makes the survival of cooperators easier. The pres-
ence of loners is also found to promote the presence of
cooperators. There average payoff among all players is
also found to be enhanced in the presence of loners. We
discussed the influence of a square lattice in terms of the
payoffs of the players. In a square lattice, spatial restric-
tion is imposed on the players in that a player can only
interact with the four nearest neighbors. This leads to
a payoff that does not only depend on the character but
also depend on the local environment in which the player
is competing in. The players in the local environment, in
turns, are also competing in their own local environment.
This will lead to clustering or aggregation of players in
the square lattice into configurations that the payoffs fa-
vored. The dependence of the frequencies on r in a square
lattice then reflects the change in preferred configurations
as r is changed.
We also studied the effects of the noise parameter in
the adaptive mechanism. It is found that as the noise
parameter increases, the change of the frequencies with
r becomes more gradual. This is related to the impor-
tance of the ordering of the many payoffs in the adaptive
mechanism. As the noise parameter increases, the exact
ordering of the payoffs becomes less important and the
change in frequencies becomes more gradual.
In closing, we note that it will be interesting to further
investigate the effects of loners in the snowdrift game in
networks of other structures. Among them are the re-
wiring of regular lattices into a small-world network or a
random network and the scale-free networks [27].
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